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AVIATION AND LIFE INSURANCE
By ROBERT A. ADAMS-
In no field of legal learning has there been any clearer
demonstration that law meets changed conditions as changes
develop than may be found in consideration of aviation and
life insurance. Particularly is this conclusion obvious by
reason of the fact that aviation is a comparatively recent
development in itself and extensive use of air travel by the
general public runs back for little more than a single decade.
Consequently, the evolution of the law has covered only the
last few years and its entire growth is quickly visualized.
It is not the purpose of this paper to alarm the reader or
to suggest even the possibility that his insurance may be in-
validated by an occasional trip in the air. A study of the
conditions or restrictions applying to anyone's insurance might
be desirable but few will find that they are under any re-
striction as to participation in aviation activities except pos-
sibly as to accidental death benefits or where there is some
exceptional interest in aviation. The questions involved are
of interest, however, particularly as demonstrating the ra-
pidity with which the insurers have recognized the develop-
ment of aviation and have sought to meet such conditions.
There has been created a fairly well established body of
law on life insurance; policy forms have become largely
*Of the Indianapolis Bar.
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standardized; certain principles have become quite thoroughly
settled and consequently, a new field open to insurance, with
new and exceptionally serious risks, necessitates only a new
viewpoint of old problems rather than the establishment of
an entirely new body of law. The science of aviation has
changed so rapidly that the application of settled legal prin-
ciples to the questions growing out of aviation has similarly
been subject to rapid and very complete change.
It has been said that one of the few rather simple things
about life insurance litigation is the fact that claims on policies
are subject to the single test of whether the insured is alive
or dead (omitting, of course, consideration of questions of
identification, simultaneous death, disappearance, pre-existing
diseases and few other possibilities). This test particularly
applies to aviation wherein a serious accident in most in-
stances means only death to all concerned. A very recent
judicial expression of the danger involved is found in the
decision of the United States District Court of Wyoming in
a case where an otherwise unexplained airplane accident oc-
curred and an attempt was made to predicate liability upon
negligence by applying the theory of assumption of risk:
"It may be that in the not too distant future in the evolution and
development of the wonderful and enchanting science of aviation, a
sufficient fund of information and knowledge may be afforded to make
a safe basis in compensating for injuries sustained, * * * but it
seems to me quite clear that that time has not yet arrived. Man has
made rapid strides within a very small cycle in his endeavor to become
master of the air, of which the bird until recently has been exclusively
king in his own right, but with the exceedingly large number of un-
explained and inexplicable catastrophies it is evident that he has not yet
become such master. It will not do to discourage the pioneer by making
him assume undue hazards in a monetary way. In the meantime it is
quite evident that those who choose air-ways for transportation must in
many instances be held to have themselves assumed the risk."''
For the purpose of this paper a consideration of aviation
and life insurance necessarily must recognize various types
or groups of flyers, as for example, the professional or ama-
teur pilot, the aviation official or business executive making
I Cohn v. United Air Lines Transport Corp. (1937), 17 F. Supp. S65.
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constant use of air service with complete control though not
doing the actual piloting, and, as the most interesting from
the standpoint of the general public, that group of those who,
from time to time, use aviation as a means of transportation
in the regular normal course of life. Naturally, of much
more restricted interest is the attitude of life insurance to
the professional pilot or the aeronautic enthusiast, ambitious
to become a pilot as compared with the last group, to which
this paper is largely directed. It should again be noted, how-
ever, that those actually affected by aviation are very limited
in number.
What development has occurred in aviation? From the time
when the Wright Brothers first successfully operated a heavier
than air flying machine, the advancement made in the science
of flying has been rapid and constant, so that now air trans-
portation service is offered and accepted by the public as no
more of a novelty than rail or ocean travel, and with quite
as much accuracy of schedule. The growth from month to
month and year to year has been consistently active. An
increase of practically ten million miles flown has taken place
in 1936 over the year 1935, with an increase also of ap-
proximately 300,000 passengers, so that for the year 1936,
passenger miles flown totaled almost a half billion as com-
pared with something over 350,000,000 passenger miles flown
for the year before. To give any very extensive resume of
figures would be wearying and probably to no effect, but in
all truth it may be said that the place of aviation is now thor-
oughly established in the life of our people.
Life insurance necessarily proceeds upon carefully worked
out tables of mortality. Experience has determined with a
very complete accuracy, of each thousand insured how many
will die each year. To the insurer, it makes little difference
who dies from each group, but it makes a great deal of dif-
ference that not more will die from each group than those
who, as a result of the experience of years, may naturally be
expected to die. The tables from which such conclusions have
been prepared are based upon normal expectancy, and for
that reason, when faced with a condition involving abnormal
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and unusual mortality, the insurer seeks protection by making
exceptions which, for the purpose of the inquiry before us,
may be considered as taking out from the effect of the tables
of experience certain groups or classes.
As long as aviation was still a novelty in its early days,
even though much more unsafe than at present, aeronautic
participation by those insured was so limited numerically
that it could be overlooked as having any controlling effect
upon life insurance. As aviation became more and more ex-
tended, then it was incumbent upon the insurer to examine
the additional serious risk involved as a result thereof, par-
ticularly, when at that time any participation in aviation in-
volved a chance of death much greater than that ordinarily
assumed. Therefore, it became-the attempt of insurers either
to refuse to insure those displaying an excessive interest in
aviation, or, in some degree to limit or except from coverage
in one way or another liability to those whose deaths might
be caused, directly or indirectly, by aviation; if not as to the
entire risk, at least so far as any double indemnity was in-
volved. That exception by which the risk was minimized had
hardly become of some general use until an exception to the
exception developed whereby there was taken out from under
the interdiction of the exception by which the insured sought
to avoid liability, those who, in the normal course of their
business and personal lives, used aerial transportation. We
now have, therefore, the situation of an exception super-
imposed upon an exception and hence at the present time
there is a very limited restriction if any upon the use of air
travel in the ordinary policy of insurance.
The history of aviation shows that it secured its present
great popularity largely as a result of the World War. Im-
mediately after the war those who had had either experience
or some limited instruction in aviation promptly sought to
capitalize that experience or instruction either for their own
entertainment or as a means of employment. In quick suc-
cessive steps the flying man became an entertainer at county
fairs offering the experience of a flight in the air to all comers
where the inadequacy of equipment and frequently the in-
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adequacy of the flyer brought about a high percentage of
aviation deaths.
Next came the development of transport service, so that
at the present time a comparatively safe means of travel is
offered through the recognized transport companies by which
the various parts of the country are linked together and
although accidents, often with fatal results and frequently
with the wiping out of all concerned, still occur, between the
time when aviation had only well started five or six years
ago and the year 1936, passenger miles flown have increased
from 13,000,000 to over 70,000,000 per fatal accident.
It is significant from a legal viewpoint that the develop-
ment of aviation occurred simultaneously with the period of
the World War for there were certain similarities in the
questions involved, both in war and aviation exclusions. In-
surance policies had sometimes excluded liability as to those
engaged in military or naval service in time of war. Litiga-
tion after the war concerning deaths of persons in the military
or naval service, brought forth some rather clear expressions
on the extent and limitation of the military and naval service
policy restriction.
In one instance a direct application of the reasoning in-
volved in military cases was carried into consideration of
similar language in a case involving aviation. In 1919, the
Supreme Court of Arkansas passed upon a policy provision
that death while in the service of the army or navy in time
of war was riot a risk covered and held that the benfieciary
of the insured who died from pneumonia while in a southern
military camp in 1917, could recover only the premiums paid.2
Thereafter, the same court in another case passed on sub-
stantially the same situation, where claim was made by the
personal representative of the insured who died from in-
fluenza in Texas while a member of the aviation corps of the
2 Miller v. Illinois Bankers Life Assn. (1919), 138 Ark. 422, 212 S. W. 310.
In this case it was argued that provisions such as those involved in the contract
of insurance should be held void as against public policy as inducing the
holder to evade or resist involuntary enlistment under the draft laws, but such
contention was rejected by the court.
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army. The policy provision in that case excepted death
"while engaged in military or naval service in time of war"
and that provision presented the only question before the
court. The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the exemption
involved in the earlier case excluding service in the army or
navy in time of war meant death during the period of service
or the period of time during which the insured was in service
in the army but in the subsequent case, the phrase "engaged
in military or naval service in time of war" denoted action
or an actual discharge of duties so that "death while engaged
in military service in time of war" meant death while doing,
performing, or taking part in some military service in time
of war; in other words, it must be death caused by performing
some duty in the military service in contradistinction to death
while in the service due to causes unconnected with such serv-
ice. The court further said "the word 'engaged' as used in
the policy means an active or physical performance of some
act or duty in connection with military service" and, as the
evidenced showed that the insured died from influenza, a
disease prevalent throughout the country affecting both sol-
diers and civilians, his death was in no sense caused by per-
forming any military service or in consequence of being en-
gaged in military service. It was, therefore, held that the
exception in the policy form was inoperative and the plaintiff
prevailed.3
It is submitted that the Supreme Court of Arkansas adopted
a somewhat restricted view of the generally accepted inter-
pretation of the familiar phrase "military or naval service,"
which, as used in time of war, involved not only those actively
engaged in combat, but all those subject to military discipline
and control.
Subsequently, the Arkansas Court followed the earlier war
restriction decisions in other life insurance cases, each time
emphasizing the effect of the word "engaged," 4 and these
s Benham v. American Central Life Ins. Co. (1919), 140 Ark. 612, 2-17 S. W.
462.
4 Nutt v. Security Life Ins. Co. (1920), 142 Ark. 29, 218 S. W. 675; Benefit
Assoc. Railway Employees v. Hayden (1927), 175 Ark. 565, 299 S. W. 995.
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decisions of the Arkansas Court have been followed in other
states, including Indiana 5 where the Supreme Court in passing
upon the meaning of the word "engaged" in an aviation
clause held that a passenger was not engaged in aeronautics,
the word "engaged" meaning to carry on, to conduct, to
employ oneself rather than to relate to a single act; to say
that one is engaged in some activity is to say that the act is
continuous and, therefore, the court held that engaged in
aviation denotes and suggests permanency or continuity, or
frequency of action and does not aptly describe a single iso-
lated act of riding in an airplane as a passenger.8
The trend of the cases is that any exception from liability
appearing in a contract of insurance in which the language
used involves the idea of being engaged in aeronautics, neces-
sarily includes an activity beyond that of mere passivity. It
means a certain degree of direction, of control, and in the
absence of that element, there would be found no exception
from liability where no such control was exercised by the
person riding in the plane, and the exception was built around
some form of the word "engage." 7
It is, of course, evident that a pilot would clearly be en-
gaging in aviation but it may be accepted that a passenger is
not so engaged, unless when the phrase includes "as a pas-
senger or otherwise."
The other most common phrase found in policy forms uses
the word participating rather than engaging in aviation,
aeronautics and the like. Again with reference only to pas-
sengers rather than to pilots, it may be said that an exception
in the policy contract relieving the company from liability
as to those participating in aviation as passengers is effective
and where a passenger comes to his death, no liability exists
5 Masonic Accident Ins. Co. v. Jackson (1929), 200 Ind. 472, 164 N. E. 628.
6 These are but a few of many cases dealing with the word "engaged" but
may be accepted as leading cases upon that question.
7 The opinion of the Indiana Appellate Court in Masonic Accident Ins. v.
Jackson (1925), 147 N. E. 156 may be disregarded as clearly erroneous and
superseded by the opinion of the Supreme Court under the same title reported
in 200 Ind. 472.
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on the part of the insurer where an exception involving such
terminology is found.
The United States Supreme Court has not as yet dealt with
any cases involving aviation and life insurance where an ex-
ception from liability is included in the policy by the expression
"engaging in aeronautics" or "participating in aviation" or
variations of either phrase. A few years ago, however, the
United States Supreme Court did take jurisdiction of a case
where the point involved was whether recovery was permis-
sible upon a fraternal benefit certificate in which an exclusion
applied to any member participating in the moving of explo-
sives." As an officer of an explosive manufacturing company,
the insured assisted in the delivery of explosives and by reason
of the specially constructed truck upon which he was riding
being hit by a train, the insured was blown to pieces. Cer-
tiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
was granted to resolve a possible conflict with other Federal
decisions dealing with aviation, in both of which the exception
under examination being participation as a passenger or
otherwise in aviation or aeronautics.9 The court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Cardozo, said that participation in the
carriage of explosives imports something more than the mere
presence of the insured ii the vehicle of carriage, and then
added, "One who becomes a passenger in an airplane may
thereby participate in aeronautics10 , but it does not follow
that he participates in the carriage of the mails, and this
though the plane to his knowledge is in part devoted to that
use." However, it was pointed out that the insured's rela-
tion was not as remote or passive as the relation of a passen-
ger. He was facilitating the delivery of explosives, and the
return journey to his office had the same motive and occasion
that induced the journey out. As stated by the court, "At the
moment of the casualty the insurance was suspended by an
8Travelers Protective Assoc. Ins. Co. of America v. Prinsen (1934), 291
U. S. 576, 54 Supreme Court 502, 78 Law Ed. 999.
9 Pitman v. Lamar Life Ins. Co. (1927), C. C. A., 17 F. (2nd) 370; Head
v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. (1930), C. C. A., 43 F. (2nd) 517.
1OHead v. N. Y. Life, supra; Pitman v. Lamar Life Ins. Co., supra; Bew
v. Travelers Ins. Co. (1921), 95 N. J. Law 533, 112 A. 859, 14 A. L. R. 983.
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aggravation of the hazard, and suspended it remained till the
forbidden hazard was removed." The decision is not author-
ity for any conclusion that the effect of the "participating"
cases are thereby weakened in view of the facts and the extent
of "participation" by the insured.
Recently, the United States Supreme Court has refused
to take jurisdiction in a widely publicized case where the
Circuit Court of Appeals of the Eighth Circuit held that
where a passenger was killed in an airplane crash the death
was not the result of participation in aeronautics."- In that
case, the policy provided that double indemnity should not
be payable if death resulted from a participation in aero-
nautics. The District Court held in favor of the company
upon the ground that one who rides in an airplane as a pas-
senger participates in aeronautics within the meaning of the
terms of the policy, and that the death of the insured resulted
from participation in aeronautics. The Circuit Court of the
Eighth Circuit reversed the lower court, saying: "We con-
clude that the words 'participation in aeronautics', as used in
these policies, do not, properly construed, include a passenger
on a transport airplane * * * ." It should be noted,
however, that the policy provision did not state "participating
as a passenger or otherwise" and the court, therefore, held
that the phrase used was ambiguous, with the usual result.
It is to be recalled that the Supreme Court in the Prinsen
case as already quoted said one who becomes a passenger in
an airplane may thereby participate in aeronautics, citing with
approval decisions of the Fifth ant Tenth Circuits. In one
case, the insured was killed by being struck by the propeller
after alighting from the grounded plane and starting to walk
to his car, but the Fifth Circuit held that the company was
not liable because the death of the insured was the result of
participation in an aeronautic expedition or activity, which
did "not begin or end with the actual flight;" his presence
at the place where he was killed was immediately connected
with and incidental to the trip, and, hence, "occurred while
11 Gregory v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. (1935), C. C. A. Eighth, 78 F.
(2d) 522. Certiorari denied: 56 Supreme Court 157, 80 Law Ed. 126.
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he was participating in an aeronautic activity."' 12 The Fifth
Circuit has likewise declared that a passenger killed in a
crash was participating in aeronautics.'3 The Sixth Circuit
in another case involving an airplane crash where the insured
by reason of complete control of the flight was more than a
mere passenger held that death resulted from participation
in aeronautic operations 14 , although the court pointed out
that it was unnecessary to decide the question of the proper
application of the phrase to a mere passenger. Subsequently,
the Sixth Circuit had directly presented the question of a mere
passenger under a policy provision "engaging, as a passenger
or otherwise, in submarine or aeronautic operations"'15, and
the court held that the company was not liable, citing many
cases as to the difference in meaning between engage and
participate, and holding that the phrase "as a passenger or
otherwise" made the restriction all inclusive, even to the
extent of overcoming the otherwise limiting effect of the use
of the Word "engaging."
By the decision of the Eighth Circuit in the Gregory case,
it was held that because the insured was a mere passenger in
the plane there was no participation in aeronautics. Numer-
ous state cases had already decided that a passenger par-
ticipated in aeronautics by partaking of the pleasure and
benefits of the art or practice of sailing or floating in the air 6,
or, again, and to the same effect, a passenger participates
within the intent and meaning of a provision when flying in
the air.'7 It was argued that certiorari should be granted in
order to resolve this apparent conflict, and it is to be re-
gretted that by the refusal of the United States Supreme
Court to accept jurisdiction, some conflict in the decisions still
remains.
12 Pitman v. Lamar Life Ins. Co., supra.
's Head v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co..(1930), 43 F. (2d) 517, 519-521.
24 First National Bank v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. (1933), C. C. A.
Sixth, 62 F. (2d) 681.
15 Mayer v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. (1934), 74 F. (2d) 118.
16 Bew v. Travelers Ins. Co. (1921), 95 N. J. Law 533.
17Travelers Ins. Co. v. Peake (1921), 82 Fla. 128, 89 So. 418; Meredith
v. Businessmen's Assoc. (1923), 213 Mo. App. 688, 252 S. W. 976.
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The latest expression of any court on the use of the words
"engaging" or "participating" appears in a decision of the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, handed down June 3, 1937, entitled Christen v. New
York Life Ins. Co. 17a
The insured held seven policies, upon which the face amount
had been paid in each case and only the double indemnity was
in controversy. Upon five of the policies it was provided that
the double indemnity was not payable if the insured's death
resulted from "engaging as passenger or otherwise in aero-
nautic operations," while in the other two policies double
indemnity benefits. were not payable if insured's death re-
sulted from "participation as a passenger or otherwise in
aviation or aeronautics."
While a passenger for hire on a commercial plane, the
insured who had no connection with aviation whatever was
killed as a result of a crash. The court pointed out that
identical language had been made the subject of judicial
scrutiny, and discussed three cases, each against the New York
Life, which have been mentioned in this paper, the Gold-
smith case, the Mayer case and the Gits case.
In the first two cases a policy provision excluded liability
when death resulted from engaging as a passenger or other-
wise, and recovery for double indemnity was denied. In the
Gits case it was held that a passenger for hire was not. "en-
gaged in submarine or aeronautic operations." The court,
although constrained to follow the Gits case, pointed out that
the policies involved contained the additional Iqualifying
phrase "as a passenger or otherwise" which, as pointed out
in the Mayer case, covered everyone whether employee, pilot,
mechanic or executive, and whether a fare-paying passenger
or not whose death resulted from his presence in the plane
at the time of the accident.
It was likewise held that such exclusion was not precluded
by the incontestable clause, and that by reason of the excep-
tion in each policy from liability for death resulting from
17a 19 F. Supp. 440.
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engaging or participating as a passenger or otherwise in
aviation, it was held that the insurer was not liable for the
double indemnity.
The law seems rather confused but it appears that a clause
excluding coverage of one participating as a passenger or
otherwise would b6 adequate to protect an insurer against
liability.
The courts have frequently fallen back on the doctrine of
inherent ambiguity for sustaining findings against insurance
companies, although this theory has been less used in aviation
cases than in many other questions concerning insurance law.
The words of Sanborn, C. J. are apt: "That the intent of the
parties might have been better expressed is of no importance.
It is ambiguity, and not awkwardness of language which opens
the door for construction. If the meaning of language is
clear, there is no room for construction."18
The Gregory case to which reference has already been
made held that "participation in aeronautics" was ambiguous,
and numerous decisions of both state and Federal courts,
prior thereto have'held similar provisions, in some cases am-
biguous and in others clear and unequivocal. As the excep-
tion clauses have become somewhat .standardized, it would
appear that it may be anticipated that courts will not rely
solely upon a claim of ambiguity to support a finding against
an insurer where exclusion clauses are being considered.
Where it was claimed that the provisions of the policy
were ambiguous, a New York court held that the policy was
not ambiguous in the use of the word "expedition" as carrying
"a notion of exploratory or warlike enterprises" without
giving any consideration to any other words in the exemption
clause. The conclusion of the court was that such a phrase
could not exclude recovery for death of a passenger who did
not conclude that a customary and usual trip in regular course
of transportation would be considered an "aeronautical ex-
pedition."'1
9
18 Goldsmith v. N. Y. Life (1934), 69 F. (2d) 273.
19 Gibbs v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the U. S. (1930), 246 N. Y. Sup.
560.
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One of the most recent aviation cases again considers the
question of an aeronautical expedition where the insured took
a pleasure trip over an airport. The court pointed out that
the mythical average man would not think of the ordinary
airplane trip as excluded by the formidable words submarine
or aeronautic expeditions. "On the contrary, the words carry
an implication of a military expedition or an exploration into
remote regions or over new routes. If it were intended when
the policy was drafted and offered for sale to exclude from
coverage every loss resulting from an airplane trip or flight,
it is believed that counsel drafting the clause could have found
language less apt to mislead the buying public than such a
redoubtable phrase as this. A judgment for the defendant,
the insurer, in the lower court was, therefore, reversed upon
the ground that no one in common speech would ever refer
to an ordinary short trip in a plane as an expedition in view
of the extensive change in the attitude towards aviation, and
with the citation of most of the familiar cases, the court held
that the phrase was ambiguous.20
Certainly, the use of the word "expedition" is no longer
to be considered as adequate to relieve an insurer from lia-
bility, whether considered either as ambiguous or perfectly
plain, particularly, in view of the widespread acceptance of
air travel in modern life.
The exclusion clauses heretofore considered have for the
most part applied only to double indemnity by features of
policies as to the entire policy. One phrase of the entire
matter of the legal status of aviation, difficult to cover briefly,
is found in the application of the theory of coverage as
limited by contestability. The law has become pretty well
settled that the incontestable clause in policies of life insurance
means what it says, and that after the period covered by the
clause has expired then the company cannot contest. As some-
times expressed, the cause of death has ceased to be an issue
of fact.
20 Day v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the U. S. (1936), C. C. A. Tenth,
83 F. (2d) 147.
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One of the most interesting and striking developments in
the law of insurance has been the holding that as applied to
aviation, there can be an exclusion of coverage where an
aviation exclusion rider is attached to the policy even after
the contestable period. This theory was developed by Mr.
Justice Cardozo while sitting as Chief Judge of the New
York Court of Appeals in the now famous Conway case.21
The conclusion of the court was that only within the limits
of the 'coverage expressly agreed to by the parties to the
contract would a liability on the policy of insurance exist.
Thereafter, the same theory was approved by the Circuit
Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit 22, and the Supreme
Court of the State of Washington. 23  Subsequently, however,
the Supreme Court of Louisiana determined that by reason
of the omission from the incontestable clause of an exception
as to aviation a general exclusion form coverage by a rider
would be invalid thereby denying the coverage theory estab-
lished by the New York decision. 24
The word "operations" as used in connection with aviation
has been declared ambiguous and tending to indicate a con-
tinuous and occupational relation as used in conjunction with
aeronautics. 25  It would plainly appear, therefore, that where
the insurer has used the word "operations" in an exception,
it is not sufficient to warrant the conclusion that the insurer
is relieved from liability by reason of an aviation experience,
although the courts have taken the view that the objection
lies more in the fact that it is ambiguous than otherwise and
21Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Conway, Superintendent of Insurance
(1-930), 252 N. Y. 449, 169 N. E. 642.
22 Head v. New York Life Ins. Co. (1930), C. C. A. Tenth, 43 F. (2d)
517.
23 Pacific Mutual Life Ins. 'Co. v. Fishback (1933), 171 Wash. 244, 17
Pac. (2d) 841.
24 Bernier v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. (1932), 173 La. 1078, 139 S. 629.
25 Gits v. New York Life Ins. Co. (1929), C. C. A. Seventh, 32 F. (2d) 7;
Charett v. Prudential Ins. Co. (1930), 202 Wis. 470, 232 N. W. 848; Missouri
State Ins. Co. v. Martin (1934), 188 Ark. 907, 69 S. W. (2d) 1081; First
National Bank of Chattanooga v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. (1933), C. C. A.
Sixth, 62 F. (2d) 681. In the latter case the evidence showed an actual direc-
tion on the part of the insured against the advice and judgment of the pilot.
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with the addition of the phrase "engaged as a passenger or
otherwise in aeronautic operations," no ambiguity would
exist. 26
When fare paying passengers are excepted from an avia-
tion exclusion rider, their insurance is not affected by the
aviation hazard, and claims are fully recognized despite a
participation in aviation. However, where there is evidence
of no possibility of a fare being paid or where it would have
been contrary to law to have been a fare paying passenger,
courts have recognized that no liability exists under the typical
exception.27
The decisions have, for the most part, recognized a liability
where accidents have happened in connection with flying,
although not as the result of an actual crash of a plane, as
for example, where, after completing a flight, insured was
struck by a propeller 28 , though another court, where the ex-
ception provided against liability for death in consequence of
participating in aeronautics, beld that death caused by the
propeller after a flight could not be said to be in direct conse-
quences of the flight, and therefore, not within the bounds
of the aeronautical exceptions. 29  Spinning a propeller prep-
aratory to taking off,30 and death while boarding a plane'
have both been considered as within the exception as was
likewise a death where a seaplane was compelled to come to
rest on the sea and one of the occupants was drowned by the
waves, 32 and in each case recovery was denied.
It may likewise be of interest to note that the phrase
"aviation operation" has been considered as sufficiently broad
26 Gits v. New York Life Ins. Co. (1929), C. C. A. Seventh, 32 F. (2d) 7.
27 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Halcomb (1935), C. C. A. Ninth, 79 F.
(2d) 788; Padgett v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1934), 206 N. C. 365, 173
S. E. 903.
2 8 Pitman v. Lamar Life Ins. Co., Supra.
29 Tierney v. Occidental Life of California (1928), 89 Cal. App. 799, 265
Pac. 400.
80 Blonski v. Bankers Life Ins. Co. (1932), 209 Wis. 5, 243 N. W. 410.
31 Murphy v. Union Indemnity Co. (1931), 172 La. 383, 134 So. 256.
82 Wendorff v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co. (1927), 318 Mo. App. 363, 1
S. W. (2d) 99.
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to include one operating a glider where the insured was killed
by a crash."a
Aviation riders used in cases. of exceptional risk and gen-
erally accepted as covering the situation by which an excep-
tion from liability is established are approved by a majority
of the state insurance departments. A form rather widely
used is:
"Death as a result of service, travel or flight in any species of air-
craft, except as a fare paying passenger on a licensed aircraft piloted
by a licensed passenger pilot on a scheduled passenger air service regu-
larly offered betwe'en specified airports, is'a risk not assumed by this
policy, but if the insured shall die as a result, directly or indirectly, of
such service, travel or flight, the company will pay the beneficiary the
reserve on this policy less any indebtedness thereon."
The terminology thus used is an outgrowth of the various
decisions, and it is believed that there is given to the insured
under such form of rider the largest possible protection for
individual policyholders as well as an adequate protection
to the insurer against the unusual risk involved in air service.
Usually a development of law will represent the slow
change of centuries of consideration. Aviation, however, has
grown so rapidly, and almost from day today has shown
such advancement that a similar speed of change and develop-
ment has occurred in the law, so that in a decade and a half
there is now established a very thoroughly worked out recog-
nition of aviation and its relationship to life insurance.
The position of life insurance in connection with the de-
velopment of aviation has consistently been a recognition of
the advancements made in that interesting field. With a
purpose of offering protection to as broad a group as possible
serving as the first test of the attitude of insurance on any
phase of life, as aviation has increased in importance in the
normal activities of the American public, so has the viewpoint
of insurance extended and developed. The burden upon the
underwriter and legal counsel has been to recognize coverage
as rapidly as justified by experience without losing sight of
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the obligation to avoid unnecessary risks involved in unknown
fields. Insurance theoretically covers the absolutely normal
life. It is for that reason that the law has recognized any
attempt to protect in some degree against death by reason of
war or suicide as an abnormal and unpredictable conclusion
of life, which, but for the exigencies of war or the act of
suicide, would have been more extended. At times of strain,
the span of life is shortened in many instances. The burden
of business in the past decade has been such that many men
have worn themselves out and have come to an untimely
death all too early as the result of the physical and mental
effort required in times of economic adversity. All of that
makes no change in the attitude of insurance for 'that is the
responsibility normally assumed, but where the insured vol-
untarily places himself in a position of unusual risk as in a
participation in aeronautic activities, the insurer is thoroughly
justified in seeking a protection by policy limitation against
the unusual strain put upon the accepted basis of actual or
anticipated mortality. Consequently, as participation in avia-
tion became more popular, the first attempt of the insurers
was to except from liability those policyholders who involved
themselves in that extraordinary risk. With the courts con-
stantly seeking *to keep such exception within the most re-
stricted position, no very definite knowledge existed at any
time by which either the insured or insurer could be positive
as to the liability for death caused by some form of aero-
nautics, nor could we as practicing lawyers advise our clients
as to, their rights or liabilities.
As aviation increased in popular use and in safety for the
casual flyer, insurance relaxed in its efforts at protection
against unusual risks as those risks were minimized until it
may now be said with a high degree of accuracy that for the
ordinary individual who, from time to time, sees fit to use
established aviation as a means of transportation, his insur-
ance situation is not materially changed from that which
existed prior to the development of science of aeronautics.
It is not to be denied that the risk is materially greater than
that involved in railway, steamship, or even motor transpor-
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tation, but the insurer has accepted that additional chance as
inherent in the development of business and a risk to be taken
if the service of insurance to the public is not to be unduly
restricted. It is submitted, therefore, that from the stand-
point of law as interpreted by the courts and as applied to
the business of life insurance, there has been a splendid dem-
onstration of a willingness on the part of life insurance to
recognize and accept changing conditions of life, and to meet
those conditions fairly as they occur. It is to the great credit
of life insurance that it has proceeded so rapidly in meeting
conditions as they have developed in the rapidly changing
field of aviation.
